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Abstract
For OECD countries there is an intriguing variety of combinations between total fertility rate
(TFR) and female labor force participation rate (FPR) suggesting the existence of multiple
equilibria. This paper provides a differential game framework where the employment choices
by husband and wife affect a family’s fertility. The model has multiple open-loop equilibria
characterized by different combinations of FPR and TFR that are consistent with the
empirical cross-country evidence. The dynamic trajectory from one equilibrium point to
another also sheds lights on possible demographic transition of individual countries as
displayed in their time series data. The model stresses that the husband’s employment
decisions are as important as wife’s in determining family size.
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One of the striking features regarding actual fertility in some industrialized countries such
as Italy, Spain and Greece is the existence of low levels of fertility rate and low levels female
labor force participation [Ahn and Mira, 2002]. This evidence [see Figure 1] is interesting
and somewhat surprising since traditional economic theory [e.g., Becker, 1965; Mincer, 1985]
predicts a negative relationship between total fertility rates [TFR] and female labor force
participation rates [FPR]. The idea lies on the opportunity costs of women’s time. Increas-
ing female wages increase female labor supply; the more time individual women spend at
work means less time dedicated to child rearing. As child rearing is intensive in mother’s
time there is a trade-oﬀ between time spent at work and time spent in child rearing. In
this framework individual women are unable to combine work with child rearing being con-
strained to make either-work-or-children choices. As a consequence it is expected an inverse
relationship between FPR and TFR. This is why the recent cross-country evidence from
southern European countries and Japan of neither-work nor-children decision is puzzling.
 
Figure 1: Fertility and Female Labor Force Participation
The sign of the cross-country correlation between TFR and FPR changed over the
decades, in the 1970 the correlation was negative and it became positive in the mid eight-
ies. In spite of the change in the sign of the cross-country correlation, TFR and FPR are
negatively correlated within countries, i.e., the mean number of children is always lower for
working woman than non-working woman. This is consistent with the micro economic the-
ories of the family. Therefore the macro and micro evidence run in opposite directions [De
Laat and Sanz, 2004].
1Another interesting feature concerning the relationship between TFR and FPR is that
when we analyze the time series for individual countries, we have a wide variety of dynamic
behavior. There are countries, such as Sweden and Norway that went from low FPR and
TFR to high FPR and TFR, while there are other countries, such as Italy and Spain that
went from high fertility and low FPR to low fertility and low FPR.
Such diversity of combinations between TFR and FPR, not surprisingly, has triggered a
large literature. Several papers that focus on the compatibility of work and children advanced
some explanations for the observed combinations between TFR and FPR. The explanations
can be divided into two broad categories [Rindfuss and Brewster, 1996]: 1) social-structural
factors and 2) ideational factors.
The social-structural factors emphasize family policies and cash beneﬁts, on the one hand,
and labor market issues and the availability of childcare, on the other hand. The family
policies studied involve housing allowances, tax relief, parental leave and child beneﬁts [e.g.,
Hantrais, 1997; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000]. Some of the labor market issues studied
are the ﬂexibility of employment and work hours and the unemployment rate [e.g., Ahn
and Mira, 2002]. Regarding child care, the literature discusses its provision, whether it is
private or public, and its cost, whether it is private, state-funded or a mixed system [e.g., Di
Tomasso, 1999; Del Boca, 2002] and the transmission of human capital [Ortega and Tanaka,
2004].
The ideational factors emphasize the role of cultural factors in shaping the division of do-
mestic work. The key here is the understanding of social norms regarding the role of women
and men in domestic labor [e.g., Bettio and Villa, 1998; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000;Lagerlof,
2003]. In more traditional societies [e.g.,Munshi and Myaux, 2002], women devote signiﬁ-
cantly more time to unpaid work than men. In addition, there is evidence that in high-fertility
countries men are increasingly involved in childcare. For instance, the average weekly hours
devoted to housework by Japanese men is 3.5, whereas in the USA it is 13.8 and in Sweden
18.1 [De Laat and Sanz, 2004].
The evidence regarding cross-country data presented above raises an interesting question:
Is it possible to explain such diﬀerent cross-country outcomes within a uniﬁed framework?
The empirical evidence suggests multiple equilibria. This paper provides a dynamic employ-
ment choice and fertility model that has multiple steady state equilibria consistent with the
observed current cross-country variation of FPR and TFR.
The dynamic model can also address, at least partially, the time series properties of
individual countries. That is, it can tackle the question of why some countries went from
low FPR and TFR to high FPR and TFR, like Sweden and Norway. This question can be
addressed through the analysis of the dynamic trajectories between diﬀerent steady state
equilibrium points.
Therefore, the theoretical model can be used to help understand the available data. By
2focusing in the present time, the cross-section data can be addressed through the analysis
of the steady state equilibria of the model, while the time series data can be illuminated by
the transitional dynamics from one equilibrium point to another.
The model’s departure point is that a couple makes choices regarding their work and
home time and that the number of children is aﬀected by these decisions. We model the
husband and wife’s employment decisions in a diﬀerential game framework since they may
have diﬀerent preferences concerning how much time to spend at work or at home. The
model has multiple open-loop equilibria characterized by diﬀerent combinations of FPR
and TFR that resemble the empirical cross-country evidence. The dynamic trajectory from
one equilibrium point to another also sheds lights on possible demographic transition of
individual countries as displayed in their time series data. Moreover, the model stresses that
the husband’s employment decisions are as important as the wife’s in determining the family
size.
2 Model
The model adapts the framework put forward by Feichtinger and Wirl (1993). The husband
and the wife decide how much time to spend at home and outside home [working and/or in
leisure]. The husband’s working hours plus the leisure time spent outside home are denoted
by x(t); thus 1 − x(t) stands for the husband’s home time, where the total available time is
normalized to 1. The wife’s domestic time is denoted by y(t); so 1−y(t) is the wife’s number
of hours spent outside home. Therefore, x and y are the control variables. An important
feature of this model is that the family size, or the number of children,z(t), is a result of
the couple’s interaction, which is a function [quite complex, probably non-linear] of the time
they spend together. We postulate that the number of children increases with the couple’s
time spent at home and decreases with the existing number of children. This leads to the
following diﬀerential equation:
˙ z(t) = f(1 − x(t),y(t)) − δz(t) (2.1)
By emphasizing the role of cultural factors in shaping the division of domestic work, we
assume that the preferences of women and men regarding home and outside home activities
are socially determined, including mating decisions [e.g., Dawkins, 2004]1. This means that
for the wife, given that child rearing is intensive in mother’s time, it is assumed that her
objective is to maximize the present value of instantaneous utility from children, B(z), and
domestic time, n(y). Similarly, assuming the husband’s role is shaped culturally as the
1 See Bisin and Topa (2002) for empirical models of cultural transmission.
3family’s main economic provider, the husband’s objective is to maximize the present value of
instantaneous utility from outside home time, m(x) and children, A(z). The couple discount














−rt[A(z(t)) + m(x(t))]dt (2.3)
Equations (2.1)-(2.3) describe a diﬀerential game. This paper focuses only on precommit-
ment (open-loop) strategies. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is the pair of time dependent
strategies {x∗(t),y∗(t),t ∈ [0,∞)}such that the wife maximizes her objective J1 and the
husband his objective J2. This means that the necessary optimality conditions for the con-
trol problems of both players must hold simultaneously; these conditions are listed below
using the following notation: H1 for the wife’s and H2 for the husband’s current value
Hamiltonian,λ and µ for the associated costate variables [time arguments are suppressed]:
Wife Husband




0(y) + µfy(1 − x,y) = 0 H
2
x = m
0(x) + λfx(1 − x,y) = 0 (2.5)
2 The assumptions about household decision making on labor supply and child-care are implicit in our for-
mulation (2.1)-(2.3). It is noted that parental net income [gross income, wages plus government subsi-
dies, less child-care costs] and child-care costs aﬀect labor supply decisions and family fertility (for ex-
ample, Mincer (1962) and Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974)). They also aﬀect our model’s functions:
f(1 − x,y);A(z);B(z);m(x);n(y). For simplicity, in equation (2.1), we rather work with parents’ alloca-
tion of time, x and y, and the number of children, z, than with income and prices. We can see below the
simpliﬁcation is suﬃcient to generate some interesting results that are consistent with empirical observa-
tions. In addition to the important roles of market prices and income in intra-family decision-making, we
acknowledge the fact that the intra-family decisions are also regulated by several other non-market variables,
such as cultural factors, extended family and other social networks, and tradition.
3 Our formulation is also inspired by the recent literature on non-cooperative models. There are several ap-
proaches to model household decision making process (see Bergstrom (1996, 1997) and Lundberg and Pollak
(1996) for the survey of this literature). While the conventional unitary models are simple and powerful, em-
pirical evidence supporting such models is limited. One of important features of the non-cooperative models
is that the equilibrium is self-enforcing (see Chen and Woolley (2007) for related discussions). Following this
literature, we thus assume that each household member maximizes his/her own objective function.
4˙ µ − rµ = −[B
0(z) − µδ] ˙ λ − rλ = −[A
0(z) − λδ] (2.6)
In order to solve the model, we must assume explicit functional forms:
f(1 − x,y) = h0 + h1(1 − x) + h2(1 − x)2 + w0 + w1y − w2y2
A(z) = a0 + a1z B(z) = b0 + b1z
m(x) = m0 + m1x n(y) = n0 + n1y
where all parameters are positive.
Diﬀerentiation of equations (2.5) with respect to time and substitution of the costate
variables and their time derivatives into the Euler equations (2.6) yields the following system
of diﬀerential equations:
˙ x =




[2w2y − w1][2b1w2y − b1w1 − n1(δ + r)]
2n1w2
(2.8)
˙ z = h0 + h1(1 − x) − h2(1 − x)
2 + w0 + w1y − w2y
2 − δz (2.9)
This dynamic system shows how the husband’s working and leisure time, wife’s home
time and the number of children varies along time. An interesting property of this dynamic
system is the existence of multiple steady state equilibria.
Notice that by setting ˙ x = 0 in equation (2.7) it follows that we have two steady state
values for x [denoted x1,x2]:
x1 = 1 −
h1
2h2







Non-negativity of the solutions implies that h1 < 2h2. Thus, it is suﬃcient to assume that:
h1 < h2, implying that: 0 < x1 < x2. Therefore, in x1 the husband spends more time at
home than in x2.
In the same vein, by setting ˙ y = 0 in equation (2.8) it follows that we have two steady





b1w1 + n1(r + δ)
2b1w2
(2.11)
It’s clear that: 0 < y1 < y2, as a result in y1 the wife spends more time at work and leisure
5than in y2.
Given that we have multiple equilibrium values for x and y, it follows that we have
multiple equilibrium values for z, since setting ˙ z = 0 in equation (2.9) [where the asterisk
denotes possible steady state equilibrium] yields:
z∗ = [h0 + h1(1 − x∗) − h2(1 − x∗)2 + w0 + w1y∗ − w2y∗2]δ−1
In total this model provides four steady state equilibrium points:
1) x1,y1,z1 = [h0 + h1(1 − x1) − h2(1 − x1)2 + w0 + w1y1 − w2y2
1]δ−1
2) x2,y2,z2 = [h0 + h1(1 − x2) − h2(1 − x2)2 + w0 + w1y2 − w2y2
2]δ−1
3) x1,y2,z3 = [h0 + h1(1 − x1) − h2(1 − x1)2 + w0 + w1y2 − w2y2
2]δ−1
4) x2,y1,z4 = [h0 + h1(1 − x2) − h2(1 − x2)2 + w0 + w1y1 − w2y2
1]δ−1
The points (x1,y1,z1) and (x2,y1,z4) are stable focus equilibrium points, while (x2,y2,z2)
and (x1,y2,z3) are saddle point equilibriums.
Noticing that h2(x2 + x1) > 2h2 − h1 and w2(y2 + y1) > w1, it is easy to see that z4 < z1




a1n1 . This assumption makes z4 > z3; therefore, we have z1 > z4 > z3 > z2.
As claimed in the introduction, this model can be used to understand the actual cross-
country evidence. Given the resemblance with actual country cases, we can associate each
equilibrium point to actual country characteristics. Using Figure 2, a 3-Dimensional graph,
as reference, the point (x1,y1,z1) can be associated with the USA where FPR and TFR are
high [which means high (1−y) and z, such as (1−y1) and z1], but the husband’s time spent
at home is larger than other OECD countries [low x, such as x1]. The equilibrium (x1,y2,z3)
resembles the Spanish example because of the low TFR and FPR and high unemployment
rate which may aﬀect positively the amount of time husband’s spent at home 4. In the same
fashion, one can associate the point (x2,y1,z4) with Norway, and (x2,y2,z2) with Japan. This
mapping leads us to another important contribution of our model. Instead of focusing on a
two dimensional relationship between FPR and TFR we must introduce a third dimension to
capture the husband’s employment time, which is of fundamental importance in determining
and understanding the relationship between FPR and TFR [see also De Laat and Sanz,
2004].
Another way of using the model is to focus on the dynamic trajectories from one equilib-
4 Here an important distinction is necessary since the total amount of time the husband spends at home can
be spent as leisure time and/or domestic work. In the USA the time the husband devotes to household
activities is higher than in Spain, where men enjoy more leisure time.
6Figure 2: Total Fertility, Male and Female Labor Force Participation
rium point to another.5 For instance, the dynamic trajectory of countries such as Sweden and
Norway that went from low FPR and TFR to high TFR and FPR, can be seen in our model
as the transition from equilibrium point (x2,y2,z2), to equilibrium point (x2,y1,z4). In order
to understand this, think of Sweden or Norway in 1970 as initially in point (x2,y2,z2), and in
2000 in point (x2,y1,z4). The dynamic transition they experienced, through the increase in
FPR and TFR is described by the trajectory that departs from equilibrium point (x2,y2,z2)
and ends in equilibrium point (x2,y1,z4). Notice that in this case the number of hours the
husband spends at home did not change and only FPR and TFR increased.
3 Concluding Remarks
For OECD countries, a variety of combinations between total fertility rate (TFR) and female
participation rate (FPR) in the labor market have been documented empirically. There are
countries that present low TFR and low FPR, countries that have high TFR and high FPR
and other countries that have low FPR and high TFR. The empirical evidence suggests
multiple equilibria. This paper provides a diﬀerential game framework where employment
5 Mathematically the transition can be studied by analyzing the dynamic system formed by equations (2.1),
(2.7), (2.8), and (2.9). Given any initial condition for z, we can study the paths towards the four identiﬁed
equilibria. We use Scandinavia as an example, but our paper is able to ﬁt other cases as well. However, the
causes of such a transition can be diﬀerent across countries and identifying these causes is interesting in its
own right but beyond the scope of this paper.
7choices by husband and wife aﬀect family’s fertility. The model has multiple open-loop
equilibria characterized by diﬀerent combinations of FPR and TFR consistent with the cross-
country empirical evidence. The dynamic trajectory from one equilibrium point to another
also sheds lights on possible demographic transition of individual countries as displayed
in their time series data. In addition, the model stresses that the husband’s employment
decisions are as important as wife’s in determining family size.
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